You seem to be into formal metaethics more than I am, so maybe you can help clarify this... I see lots of arguments between moral "realists" and "non-realists", but does anyone ask *in what way* moral truths are real, assuming they are?
We're not in the middle ages anymore when things were either real in some kind of first-principles ontological way, or wholly unreal. We recognize the truths that the Earth orbits the Sun, that 2+2=4, and that human beings have a moral sense, but they are not necessarily true in the same ways; some truths can be more fundamental than others, some axiomatic, some empirical, and others can be derivative or emergent, but still true.
It seems to me like instead of countless arguments about what counts as a non-natural property to possibly found morals upon, it might be a better avenue of research to start at the known source, i.e our undeniable propensity for having moral judgments, and work backwards to shine some light on the multi-level evolutionary dynamics that shape it and under which it operates.
Then, if those things look universal enough, you might start having an argument to call some idealized version of those judgments "real".
Both moral realism and divine command theory, and I suppose any theory, that cannot be clearly shown to people on the internet, to be either popular or supported by direct empirical evidence, could be accused of being a fringe theory, and not worth much attention from the general population.
I suppose Christianity lasted through its early stages of being a fringe theory, but eventually claimed the mainstream, particularly once it gained the favour of the Roman Emperor Constantine.
I think everybody, as they go through adult life, has some kind of moral 'inertia', and will resist an external influence trying to correct them on what is right and what is wrong. Yet we all have to follow 'commands' in order to behave in a socially (and legally) acceptable way. For example, even if you are running late for an appointment, you have to obey the road rules while driving.
God, as a symbol of higher authority in general, can be related to morality, but if our understanding of God is highly subjective, how much help is it to appeal to God to establish, objectively, what moral rules should be followed, when they should be, and what should not?
I don't think your argument, if I understand it correctly, is a knock down argument of divine command theory, but, in my opinion, you have shown that the deductive form of the moral argument is flawed, since there are other plausible arguments for obtaining objective morals. Certainly, many apologists, who have little interest in academic research, will act as though they possess knock down arguments for proving the existence of God, since being very assertive and showing some sign of using reason will persuade, maybe quite often, people who are anxious for answers to difficult questions.
So based!
You seem to be into formal metaethics more than I am, so maybe you can help clarify this... I see lots of arguments between moral "realists" and "non-realists", but does anyone ask *in what way* moral truths are real, assuming they are?
We're not in the middle ages anymore when things were either real in some kind of first-principles ontological way, or wholly unreal. We recognize the truths that the Earth orbits the Sun, that 2+2=4, and that human beings have a moral sense, but they are not necessarily true in the same ways; some truths can be more fundamental than others, some axiomatic, some empirical, and others can be derivative or emergent, but still true.
It seems to me like instead of countless arguments about what counts as a non-natural property to possibly found morals upon, it might be a better avenue of research to start at the known source, i.e our undeniable propensity for having moral judgments, and work backwards to shine some light on the multi-level evolutionary dynamics that shape it and under which it operates.
Then, if those things look universal enough, you might start having an argument to call some idealized version of those judgments "real".
Both moral realism and divine command theory, and I suppose any theory, that cannot be clearly shown to people on the internet, to be either popular or supported by direct empirical evidence, could be accused of being a fringe theory, and not worth much attention from the general population.
I suppose Christianity lasted through its early stages of being a fringe theory, but eventually claimed the mainstream, particularly once it gained the favour of the Roman Emperor Constantine.
I think everybody, as they go through adult life, has some kind of moral 'inertia', and will resist an external influence trying to correct them on what is right and what is wrong. Yet we all have to follow 'commands' in order to behave in a socially (and legally) acceptable way. For example, even if you are running late for an appointment, you have to obey the road rules while driving.
God, as a symbol of higher authority in general, can be related to morality, but if our understanding of God is highly subjective, how much help is it to appeal to God to establish, objectively, what moral rules should be followed, when they should be, and what should not?
I don't think your argument, if I understand it correctly, is a knock down argument of divine command theory, but, in my opinion, you have shown that the deductive form of the moral argument is flawed, since there are other plausible arguments for obtaining objective morals. Certainly, many apologists, who have little interest in academic research, will act as though they possess knock down arguments for proving the existence of God, since being very assertive and showing some sign of using reason will persuade, maybe quite often, people who are anxious for answers to difficult questions.