As a christian I do find what you said to be very important and must be taken seriously. I am personally a christian universalist and found Origen's and DBH perspectives on it as helpful along with several other early church fathers and theologians. I also believe that animals will be in heaven as Origen talks about. I do often wonder sometimes a lot about this issue and its heartbreaking. I even question if god is real why doesn't he do something about it. I myself have had terrible experiences in my life for example, I lost my father when I was 14. I was not a christian at the time but, afterwards I had several tremendous events where I had felt a sense of overwhelming love. I also had thankfully many friends of mine who happened to be christians be their for me and understand me in a way that they had never had before. I believe strongly and hope strongly that their is an afterlife from both what I and others I know have experienced and from reading Dale Allisons book encountering mystery. I became a christian about 3 years ago for both personal and intellectual reasons. I wonder every day why if god exists why he allowed my father to pass away so early in my life and I don't believe I will ever have an answer. I do try my hardest to make the world a better place such as helping the homeless and rescuing injured birds in my neighborhood because I believe that it at least some difference. I also hope that I and everyone that has lost a parent will be reunited with them in heaven or something like it. I know this comment is long I just wanted to let you know emerson I take what you say seriously and even though we disagree I believe your position is very understandable and many christians have much to learn from you.
I got a similar impression about God's obvious absence after our stillbirth a few years ago (and later seeing some birds attack each other). I might be tempted to add the notes you added, but you already added them. The point about not betraying those who suffer strikes me as very important, and I will continue to ponder it.
Thank you for this. That was mind expanding. You gave such a lucid description of a very important yet underrepresented issue.
Christians often critique atheism for its implied nihilism, but the problem of evil (as you have so aptly explained) demonstrates that traditional theism does not escape nihilism either. Affirming the goodness of God’s will in these absurd scenarios diminishes our understanding of good, evil, and all of our values in general.
Atheism or agnosticism without its moral demand allows us to discover values with more fidelity, but theism demands that we eventually betray our values with absurdities.
However, theism defined by a non-omnipotent God does hold some potential imo.
And this is more or less why I stick to Deism. As much as I would rather be a polytheist because it'd make for more interesting stories woven into the fabric of life.
I don't think you need to take the moral stance described here to be a theist. Most traditional forms of theism didn't regard God as a moral agent, so endorsing (for many of them cosmological) arguments for God's existence didn't mean approving of everything in creation. This paper summarizes some of the arguments contemporary philosophers of religion (most notably Marilyn McCord Adams and Mark Murphy) have given for that conclusion.
Exchanging the moral stance required by the cataphatic theist for the one required by the apophatic theist isn’t obviously morally preferable and may make things worse.
God’s perfect love is either challenged by her moral responsibility for the permission of evil or the inability of our language to appropriately describe her as such.
Argued perfectly. In terms of both reason and emotion. However why is theism identified with Christianity? To really universalise this argument you will have to use it against the solutions to the problem of evil in eastern philosophical systems. They start with reincarnation and karma but the structure of their proposed solutions become apparent only in relation to their psychology, ontology and metaphysics. In the first place in none of the Indian philosophical systems is God a creator. Creation ex nihilo, being arising from nothingness is considered righly incoherent. God is considered both the material and efficient cause of the universe. All sentient beings have a soul and the soul is considered uncreated and to have no beginning or end within time. The soul shares its Being with God, in varying ways according to different schools. For Advaita, the school of non-duality, the cosmic personal God is limited, and the ultimate reality is an infinite unconditioned undifferentiated reality with which the true Self of all creatures are identical. In other words the real nature of the sentient Self is a reality that transcends even the visible cosmic God. I am not saying your argument has no purchase against these philosophies, but it will have to be deployed in relationship to the complexity of such metaphysics to really see what its implications are for these theistic systems.
I have my own hypothesis on the matter on my substack, but I can think of a few other ways this can be tackled, although they raise their own issues:
1. Simply say there is more to ethics than preventing suffering. This is rather straightforward and intercepts the initial assumptions of suffering as paramount, and can accommodate many religions and philosophies. However, classical theism tends to use suffering as a tool to enforce divine law. Think of punishments meted out in the Jewish scriptures to transgressors, and the ultimate suffering of Hell for those who don't believe in the New Testament. So obviously, suffering is considered a bad thing in these systems, and if we posit the suffering is great enough, it still demands attention even if you think it's not the bees knees of moral norms. Does it have to be THIS bad?
2. Posit a Big Bad Guy who makes or represents evil. This can be Satan or Ahriman or Apophis, etc. and its not hard to find one in various theologies. But the theist is then presented with another dilemma: either he allows Big Bad, and we're back to square one, or he accepts that his deity is not quite powerful enough to do away with Big Bad completely. Classical theism cannot countenance this, although I have to ask: is a "God who is really powerful but just a little short of infinite power so that Bad Guy From The Game still causes trouble" really so awful? It can still be that ones deity is far more powerful than humanity, yet still not powerful enough to prevent evil. After all, if evil is as large in scope as you imply, that's a tall order for anyone. Would theism be more palpable if God was "A little less than omnipotent?"
3. If nothing is as great as the creator deity, then it stands to reason that this world is less perfect than he is. Perhaps the complexity of life, and this imperfection, means that suffering will always occur through probability, the equivalent of bugs in the system, and the fact that a complex world cannot satisfy everyone with their nuanced, complex values and needs. This may or may not require #2 to work.
3. Accept that evil is indeed under the control of one's god and deal with it. I've actually had a Jew tell me that Hitler was an instrument of his God's wrath! But again the amount of suffering makes one ask "Did it have to be this much?" and the arbitrariness of it also demands how productive it is. Could not more nazis have suffered than Jews under Hitler and still make it count? This just handwaves away omnibenevolence, or redefines it so as to be unrecognizable as we use it.
4. On the acceptance of suffering as good, I have seen some Orthodox and traditionalist Catholics say that yes, the more you suffer, the better. This seems masochistic, and requires acceptance of point #1, but still ends up appearing to make suffering the point, against the promises of happiness and blessings in this life. Even the most stoic philosopher would not want people to actively enjoy suffering. I should also note other religions and philosophies that have a warrior ethos (Norse, Bushido, etc.) can also fall under the umbrella, approaching suffering in the world as part of the battle. Of course the Norse religion also has point #2 in its belief, and Bushido incorporates Buddhism which rejects classical theism.
We may also ask whether or not omnibenevolence really is a required trait. A deity can be more loving than people, but perhaps not in an infinite sense.
Ultimately, religion is less valuable to me in explaining evil than reacting to it.
I'm more understanding of a God who says "Hey in order to make this universe diverse and complex enough to express all of my potentiality and give you enough to do, it also came with a lot of bad stuff as a byproduct. I can't make a rock to heavy to lift and I can't give you paradise and variety. But we can make it work together" than one who says "I'm the best and most loving and the evil in the world is just part of my loving perfection."
That description seems more like a non-omnipotent God rather than a non-omnibenevolent one. Omnipotence really does seem to be the most disposable, especially when we can compromise with “most-powerful” instead of all powerful.
Prescribing people to an illusion of creation’s perfection, then forcing people to swallow the “This evil is a part of My living perfection” pill when their illusion of the world’s perfection is inevitably shattered, is such a bone-headed & ham-fisted non-solution that has caused so much additional unnecessary suffering.
Why not just say creation, and therefor perfection, is still in progress? Perhaps God’s incarnation into, solidarity with, and sacrifice for the world is part of its redemption and its final perfection and most full state of creation? The beginning, the cross, the end, all part of the same process?
Absolute omnipotence does seem the weakest link, at least if one insists that an omnipotent deity would be able to make a universe free of suffering, no matter how complex and diverse that universe is. This may stray into the "can God make a rock too heavy to lift" if we think such a universe is logically impossible once set in motion, but the obstinate classical theist can always insist it could have been otherwise especially if God is the author of logic.
That creation is still in progress, and that humans must participate in it, seems reasonable to assume given our observations of change and the necessity of acting in the world. Religion in general seems to emphasize a relationship with the divine to maintain some sort of order and lessening of harms within society, so it meshes well the idea of divine-human solidarity. I think your proposal promotes feelings of intimacy and closeness to the divine as well; always a good thing.
>>Ultimately, the suffering on earth must come with a kind of endorsement and imprimatur of believers.
I think this is a bit hasty. A police officer who witnesses a crime may have a specific duty to intervene, while an equally capable civilian who could interrupt the crime might not have the same responsibility in the same situation (especially if their intervention could lead to a worse state of affairs).
By that notion, if God's regular intervention would lead to more suffering, then it seems His general disposition toward nonintervention would be morally permissible. This is not an endorsement of or indifference toward suffering but an active means of harm reduction. If God were to constantly intervene to prevent evil, people might come to expect divine intervention for any problem. They might refrain from building the social frameworks and norms necessary to curb our worst behaviors. By my lights, history supports the idea that the most grievous sources of suffering are not the intentional harm caused by private individuals but the banal neglect, indifference, and systemic failures of institutions. Additionally, they could develop the mindset that God wanted them to commit some evil simply because He didn't prevent it.
To the fawn in the forest, I would explain that God's regular intervention into the animal kingdom would likewise lead to more suffering. If God intervenes for animals but not for humans in equally painful situations, it might raise questions about why humans must endure suffering or lead people to think that God approved of animal abuse whenever He didn't intervene. Furthermore, if the natural laws acted inconsistently or changed on a whim, it would lead to moral confusion for people. Understanding the consequences of actions is critical for people making morally significant decisions.
This is a very difficult subject, and I agree theodicies often fall short of providing a satisfactory explanation for suffering. I'm also not intending to address every question about suffering, such as why God couldn't allow our bodies to endure physical trauma without the conscious experience of pain or why a tangible, material world was necessary to existence.
According to Hinduism, this awareness that the suffering in this world is wrong is the cause of liberation (moksha). The suffering in this world isn’t something the animals or barbarians are worried about. If we don’t think there’s a problem, we won’t search for a solution.
I don’t see that every theist is committed to condoning the suffering in this world or think that any instance of suffering is justified or ok. You say “theism”, but you seem to mean “Christianity”.
My point wasn’t there is no problem of evil, it’s that theism doesn’t demand we endorse or affirm that the evil and suffering in the world is morally acceptable.
But my point is that God’s *power*, when we talk about God as an agent with his/her own will, is unavoidably connected to the problem of evil that plagues the world. God seems to endorse the suffering by refusing to use their omnipotence to end the suffering. Worse still, such omnipotence is often suspect to be involved in the creation of the initial conditions for suffering.
Given that theism demands that we endorse and affirm God, the problem lies in the fact that we must now endorse the suffering God leaves unsolved or even potentially caused.
Of course, this all depends on how you define God.
I understand the logic involved and I agree with the sentiment that the evil and suffering in this world are unacceptable.
But blaming God is a reaction that falls short of a solution. The author may refuse to believe in God as some kind of protest, because it “seems like” God must endorse the suffering.
Ok, now what? The suffering we’ve declared unacceptable is still there. Withholding belief in God as an ethical protest is a sentimental reaction that achieves nothing.
This is the point where Hinduism considers our real human life to begin, at this realisation of the ethical unacceptability of our existence here. Now we’re ready to seriously inquire into not only the cause, but more importantly, the solution for evil and suffering.
To quote from my former days as an apologist: most all emotions have an underlying rationale, and rationality does not function without a values that are inherently emotional in nature. The goal isn’t to blame God as much as it is to blame and highlight an inconsistency with *belief in such* as good. (And only a good God can be real right?)
The whole point of Emerson’s original article is to demonstrate that withholding belief does accomplish something: the first being the acknowledgement of the lack of logical consistency of an all good and an all knowing/powerful God, and the second addressing some of the suffering itself. Belief or disbelief in God may not solve the problem of suffering, but a tri-omni type God understood with its full implications ADDS to it by introducing more absurdities, such as his benevolent all-encompassing divine will endorsing all that comes to pass, including all the evil. This demand perverts and undermines our understanding of goodness and is ultimately nihilistic.
Those who are relieved of suffering by believing in (such type of) God are either in denial or ignorance of its dark side, or are worshiping a fundamentally different type of God that happens to have the same name. Holding on to a belief of this view of God as an ethical protest or a sentimental reaction achieves nothing.
Emerson’s purpose here isn’t to propose an exhaustive solution to suffering, but Hinduism (or any religion’s) call to heroic action function perfectly fine without a foreknowing and omnipotent God. Perhaps it would function even better, since we do not have to question our loyalty and love to the deity we devote ourselves too
Hinduism’s solution to suffering doesn’t function at all without God. Without God there is no solution to evil and suffering, we can only endure it. For Hindu metaphysics, the idea God has a dark side, or that he creates (or endorses) suffering is logically incoherent. It’s like saying darkness can exist in the presence of light, or that light creates and endorses darkness.
If someone is as concerned about suffering as Emerson says he is - “That suffering bird is a thing of cosmic significance...” you’d expect him to be desperate to find a solution. But he concludes non-belief in God is the best moral stance. His solution reduces us to impotent bystanders who can do nothing but helplessly weep at our existential predicament. There are far better answers available.
Great post and you are right in that any theist, and in particular Christians (as I commit to), have to take the problem of suffering and evil very seriously in every respect. Pat Flynn has a great Substack (tongue-in-cheekily called “Journal of Absolute Truth”) where he approaches a lot of these challenges in a few solid ways. I would have linked to it, but I’m apparently not smart enough to figure out how to do so in an iPhone..🤷♂️
If I have the correct article in mind, it’s one that’s saying the problem of evil for the physicalist is also problematic. Yet I would argue that the traditional tri-omni-max conception of theism adds and compounds the problem of suffering in a way no other worldview can. Every theodicy that refuses to undermine God’s power ends up undermining or redefining omni-benevolence beyond recognition.
I’ve felt typical Christian theists have had it all wrong. I don’t think Christianity is about marginalizing people’s suffering and saying it doesn’t matter.
We see in John 11, Jesus weeps when he gets to Lazarus’s tomb and he sees his dead body.
When Jesus feeds the 5000, his apostles are wanting to send the people away, but Jesus tells them they must be fed… I’ve wondered if the reason people followed Jesus, was because he was so aware to the suffering people felt, and he actually did things about it. He healed people, fed them, forgave them of their shame, he dignified them.
I don’t think the argument of theism is about acknowledging a “good God” allowing bad things. Because all evidence of Jesus is about getting rid of the bad things. I think the argument if theism is understanding “why the bad things happened in the first place.”
My best suggestion is looking back to Genesis. Adam & Eve. God telling Adam and Eve to “rule over the earth.”
I believe the earth was meant to be humans domaine, in partnership with God.
But with man eating the apple and partnering with the serpent, it became the devils domaine as well.
A good God didn’t intend for that to happen, but God also gave us control over our choices, because we were meant to rule.
So suffering on this earth is meant to anger us, because of the DNA God built into us & We’re actually meant to do things about it - with the partnership of Jesus.
Jesus uses this language of the Kingdom of heaven forcefully advancing - through our prayers and actions.
I don’t know if this explains cancer, death, greed. But I do think it offers a perspective that our actions matter, we can be righteously angry at death, and believe in a good God who is trying to correct that…
Why does he wait so long, I don’t know. Maybe he is doing more about it than we realize.
I think this argument accidentally makes a case for Theism while placing the responsibility on each individual. If the question is about a belief in God being immoral because a theist would have to, at least implicitly, endorse the suffering of another, while the sufferer themselves would not agree, I would question why the question about whether the theist believes that they would agree to the same, or any type of suffering for that matter, is not being raised. If their belief in God meant that they felt that any suffering they endured in view of a greater good would be justified, you would basically be saying that their belief in God is immoral even though it would be consistent and not hypocritical in terms of permissible suffering. Either their belief is not immoral because it is consistent, or they can only account for the permissible suffering justification for their own life. In which case the responsibility would be placed on each individual.
The immorality would then lie in the level of authority the belief demands from others who are not convinced of the legitimacy of this definition of the greater good.
What someone’s suffering means to them is up for them to determine and they should not be forced into a lesser solution.
I think there might be another demand of theism that you don't consider above. You're right that theism has normative implications, but not just for what we already believe about the moral state of the world. If theism is true, there are more values than you would otherwise think, and more final values than you would otherwise think. For example, union with God is a final value that's not possibly realized on atheism. So a particular state of affairs that has weighty final disvalue on atheism might have an instrumental value or irrelevant disvalue on theism.
Think of Cain and Abel, following Eleonore Stump. Cain's brutal, needless, unjustified murder of Abel is surely horrific and disvaluable in its own right. Theists can say this. But given Abel's right-standing with God, his union with God is protected. He is in a morally significant sense (according to theism) safe. Cain, on the other hand, is in poor standing with God given his sin. Cain is in danger, despite the security of his earthly well-being.
I don't raise this example as any kind of theodicy, or even that you would find the example persuasive, but only to illustrate some normative aspects of theism that I think are commonly neglected, especially by those with consequentialist tendencies. If you are really to entertain the moral state of the world on theism, you have to also thereby consider what theism predicts is valuable, and most importantly what it says is of final value. This might require going beyond bare theism.
Regarding some of the other points, I truly lament that you have found some Christians or otherwise theists dismissive of suffering. That surely is not warranted. With respect to animal suffering, I find Swinburne's line persuasive, or at least plausible, that animals are not cognitively sophisticated enough to appreciate the badness of pain. This way, they don't suffer as much as we think they do.
So what do we make of events that draw people away from God that isn’t of their own doing? The same problem remains.
What suffering means to someone is a process they must work through on their own, and whatever prescribed and perhaps preordained meaning assigned to their suffering or violation is insulting. Religions should focus on using their tools for redeeming suffering instead of committing themselves to views that say suffering was never that terrible to begin with, bc they are a part of some higher values they were yet to be convinced of. Why else can’t I just abduct people for scientific experimentation for the greater good?
Union with God is far from an orthodox value in the western Church, though it brings some interesting perspective of “perhaps the suffering was really of my own doing,” because the individual becomes closer to being the divine and its will.
The western churches have pretty explicitly put the exaltation of Godself as the ultimate moral goal. The elevation of Godself and his will over the suffering creature comes off as dismissive and contemptible, which perhaps wouldn’t be so problematic if the expectation of God was set to be exhaustively caring and the value of a human life to be so solemnly important.
im not sure i understand the betrayal part. if god's permission of certain evils is the morally right thing to do, how does this idea of betrayal fit in? the acceptance that the permission of this evil is morally right (theism) need not focus on the agent per se, but the action itself. even if some perceived higher morality is accessed on part of the sacrifice of some agent, this higher morality is beyond and prior to the agent which has had some part of it sacrificed.
do the earlier parts of this post imply only moral realists can raise the problem of evil? or at least only cognitivists?
As a christian I do find what you said to be very important and must be taken seriously. I am personally a christian universalist and found Origen's and DBH perspectives on it as helpful along with several other early church fathers and theologians. I also believe that animals will be in heaven as Origen talks about. I do often wonder sometimes a lot about this issue and its heartbreaking. I even question if god is real why doesn't he do something about it. I myself have had terrible experiences in my life for example, I lost my father when I was 14. I was not a christian at the time but, afterwards I had several tremendous events where I had felt a sense of overwhelming love. I also had thankfully many friends of mine who happened to be christians be their for me and understand me in a way that they had never had before. I believe strongly and hope strongly that their is an afterlife from both what I and others I know have experienced and from reading Dale Allisons book encountering mystery. I became a christian about 3 years ago for both personal and intellectual reasons. I wonder every day why if god exists why he allowed my father to pass away so early in my life and I don't believe I will ever have an answer. I do try my hardest to make the world a better place such as helping the homeless and rescuing injured birds in my neighborhood because I believe that it at least some difference. I also hope that I and everyone that has lost a parent will be reunited with them in heaven or something like it. I know this comment is long I just wanted to let you know emerson I take what you say seriously and even though we disagree I believe your position is very understandable and many christians have much to learn from you.
I really appreciate this post.
I got a similar impression about God's obvious absence after our stillbirth a few years ago (and later seeing some birds attack each other). I might be tempted to add the notes you added, but you already added them. The point about not betraying those who suffer strikes me as very important, and I will continue to ponder it.
I can’t even imagine how painful that was. I’m sorry that happened, truly.
I hope this argument gets more exploration. Excellent stuff.
Thank you for this. That was mind expanding. You gave such a lucid description of a very important yet underrepresented issue.
Christians often critique atheism for its implied nihilism, but the problem of evil (as you have so aptly explained) demonstrates that traditional theism does not escape nihilism either. Affirming the goodness of God’s will in these absurd scenarios diminishes our understanding of good, evil, and all of our values in general.
Atheism or agnosticism without its moral demand allows us to discover values with more fidelity, but theism demands that we eventually betray our values with absurdities.
However, theism defined by a non-omnipotent God does hold some potential imo.
Well put. Thanks for putting this together.
And this is more or less why I stick to Deism. As much as I would rather be a polytheist because it'd make for more interesting stories woven into the fabric of life.
I don't think you need to take the moral stance described here to be a theist. Most traditional forms of theism didn't regard God as a moral agent, so endorsing (for many of them cosmological) arguments for God's existence didn't mean approving of everything in creation. This paper summarizes some of the arguments contemporary philosophers of religion (most notably Marilyn McCord Adams and Mark Murphy) have given for that conclusion.
https://philpapers.org/rec/RUBATN
Daniel,
Exchanging the moral stance required by the cataphatic theist for the one required by the apophatic theist isn’t obviously morally preferable and may make things worse.
God’s perfect love is either challenged by her moral responsibility for the permission of evil or the inability of our language to appropriately describe her as such.
None of the arguments cited above rely on aphophaticism.
Argued perfectly. In terms of both reason and emotion. However why is theism identified with Christianity? To really universalise this argument you will have to use it against the solutions to the problem of evil in eastern philosophical systems. They start with reincarnation and karma but the structure of their proposed solutions become apparent only in relation to their psychology, ontology and metaphysics. In the first place in none of the Indian philosophical systems is God a creator. Creation ex nihilo, being arising from nothingness is considered righly incoherent. God is considered both the material and efficient cause of the universe. All sentient beings have a soul and the soul is considered uncreated and to have no beginning or end within time. The soul shares its Being with God, in varying ways according to different schools. For Advaita, the school of non-duality, the cosmic personal God is limited, and the ultimate reality is an infinite unconditioned undifferentiated reality with which the true Self of all creatures are identical. In other words the real nature of the sentient Self is a reality that transcends even the visible cosmic God. I am not saying your argument has no purchase against these philosophies, but it will have to be deployed in relationship to the complexity of such metaphysics to really see what its implications are for these theistic systems.
I have my own hypothesis on the matter on my substack, but I can think of a few other ways this can be tackled, although they raise their own issues:
1. Simply say there is more to ethics than preventing suffering. This is rather straightforward and intercepts the initial assumptions of suffering as paramount, and can accommodate many religions and philosophies. However, classical theism tends to use suffering as a tool to enforce divine law. Think of punishments meted out in the Jewish scriptures to transgressors, and the ultimate suffering of Hell for those who don't believe in the New Testament. So obviously, suffering is considered a bad thing in these systems, and if we posit the suffering is great enough, it still demands attention even if you think it's not the bees knees of moral norms. Does it have to be THIS bad?
2. Posit a Big Bad Guy who makes or represents evil. This can be Satan or Ahriman or Apophis, etc. and its not hard to find one in various theologies. But the theist is then presented with another dilemma: either he allows Big Bad, and we're back to square one, or he accepts that his deity is not quite powerful enough to do away with Big Bad completely. Classical theism cannot countenance this, although I have to ask: is a "God who is really powerful but just a little short of infinite power so that Bad Guy From The Game still causes trouble" really so awful? It can still be that ones deity is far more powerful than humanity, yet still not powerful enough to prevent evil. After all, if evil is as large in scope as you imply, that's a tall order for anyone. Would theism be more palpable if God was "A little less than omnipotent?"
3. If nothing is as great as the creator deity, then it stands to reason that this world is less perfect than he is. Perhaps the complexity of life, and this imperfection, means that suffering will always occur through probability, the equivalent of bugs in the system, and the fact that a complex world cannot satisfy everyone with their nuanced, complex values and needs. This may or may not require #2 to work.
3. Accept that evil is indeed under the control of one's god and deal with it. I've actually had a Jew tell me that Hitler was an instrument of his God's wrath! But again the amount of suffering makes one ask "Did it have to be this much?" and the arbitrariness of it also demands how productive it is. Could not more nazis have suffered than Jews under Hitler and still make it count? This just handwaves away omnibenevolence, or redefines it so as to be unrecognizable as we use it.
4. On the acceptance of suffering as good, I have seen some Orthodox and traditionalist Catholics say that yes, the more you suffer, the better. This seems masochistic, and requires acceptance of point #1, but still ends up appearing to make suffering the point, against the promises of happiness and blessings in this life. Even the most stoic philosopher would not want people to actively enjoy suffering. I should also note other religions and philosophies that have a warrior ethos (Norse, Bushido, etc.) can also fall under the umbrella, approaching suffering in the world as part of the battle. Of course the Norse religion also has point #2 in its belief, and Bushido incorporates Buddhism which rejects classical theism.
“This just handwaves away omnibenevolence, or redefines it so as to be unrecognizable as we use it.” As most theodicies do.
Hit the nail on the head.
We may also ask whether or not omnibenevolence really is a required trait. A deity can be more loving than people, but perhaps not in an infinite sense.
Ultimately, religion is less valuable to me in explaining evil than reacting to it.
I'm more understanding of a God who says "Hey in order to make this universe diverse and complex enough to express all of my potentiality and give you enough to do, it also came with a lot of bad stuff as a byproduct. I can't make a rock to heavy to lift and I can't give you paradise and variety. But we can make it work together" than one who says "I'm the best and most loving and the evil in the world is just part of my loving perfection."
That description seems more like a non-omnipotent God rather than a non-omnibenevolent one. Omnipotence really does seem to be the most disposable, especially when we can compromise with “most-powerful” instead of all powerful.
Prescribing people to an illusion of creation’s perfection, then forcing people to swallow the “This evil is a part of My living perfection” pill when their illusion of the world’s perfection is inevitably shattered, is such a bone-headed & ham-fisted non-solution that has caused so much additional unnecessary suffering.
Why not just say creation, and therefor perfection, is still in progress? Perhaps God’s incarnation into, solidarity with, and sacrifice for the world is part of its redemption and its final perfection and most full state of creation? The beginning, the cross, the end, all part of the same process?
Absolute omnipotence does seem the weakest link, at least if one insists that an omnipotent deity would be able to make a universe free of suffering, no matter how complex and diverse that universe is. This may stray into the "can God make a rock too heavy to lift" if we think such a universe is logically impossible once set in motion, but the obstinate classical theist can always insist it could have been otherwise especially if God is the author of logic.
That creation is still in progress, and that humans must participate in it, seems reasonable to assume given our observations of change and the necessity of acting in the world. Religion in general seems to emphasize a relationship with the divine to maintain some sort of order and lessening of harms within society, so it meshes well the idea of divine-human solidarity. I think your proposal promotes feelings of intimacy and closeness to the divine as well; always a good thing.
>>Ultimately, the suffering on earth must come with a kind of endorsement and imprimatur of believers.
I think this is a bit hasty. A police officer who witnesses a crime may have a specific duty to intervene, while an equally capable civilian who could interrupt the crime might not have the same responsibility in the same situation (especially if their intervention could lead to a worse state of affairs).
By that notion, if God's regular intervention would lead to more suffering, then it seems His general disposition toward nonintervention would be morally permissible. This is not an endorsement of or indifference toward suffering but an active means of harm reduction. If God were to constantly intervene to prevent evil, people might come to expect divine intervention for any problem. They might refrain from building the social frameworks and norms necessary to curb our worst behaviors. By my lights, history supports the idea that the most grievous sources of suffering are not the intentional harm caused by private individuals but the banal neglect, indifference, and systemic failures of institutions. Additionally, they could develop the mindset that God wanted them to commit some evil simply because He didn't prevent it.
To the fawn in the forest, I would explain that God's regular intervention into the animal kingdom would likewise lead to more suffering. If God intervenes for animals but not for humans in equally painful situations, it might raise questions about why humans must endure suffering or lead people to think that God approved of animal abuse whenever He didn't intervene. Furthermore, if the natural laws acted inconsistently or changed on a whim, it would lead to moral confusion for people. Understanding the consequences of actions is critical for people making morally significant decisions.
This is a very difficult subject, and I agree theodicies often fall short of providing a satisfactory explanation for suffering. I'm also not intending to address every question about suffering, such as why God couldn't allow our bodies to endure physical trauma without the conscious experience of pain or why a tangible, material world was necessary to existence.
According to Hinduism, this awareness that the suffering in this world is wrong is the cause of liberation (moksha). The suffering in this world isn’t something the animals or barbarians are worried about. If we don’t think there’s a problem, we won’t search for a solution.
I don’t see that every theist is committed to condoning the suffering in this world or think that any instance of suffering is justified or ok. You say “theism”, but you seem to mean “Christianity”.
It is a problem for theist so long as they are committed to the goodness of “God’s will” combined with God’s omnipotence to do otherwise.
Given that Hinduism is a massive continent of different beliefs, I’m sure this is a problem some but perhaps not others.
My point wasn’t there is no problem of evil, it’s that theism doesn’t demand we endorse or affirm that the evil and suffering in the world is morally acceptable.
But my point is that God’s *power*, when we talk about God as an agent with his/her own will, is unavoidably connected to the problem of evil that plagues the world. God seems to endorse the suffering by refusing to use their omnipotence to end the suffering. Worse still, such omnipotence is often suspect to be involved in the creation of the initial conditions for suffering.
Given that theism demands that we endorse and affirm God, the problem lies in the fact that we must now endorse the suffering God leaves unsolved or even potentially caused.
Of course, this all depends on how you define God.
I understand the logic involved and I agree with the sentiment that the evil and suffering in this world are unacceptable.
But blaming God is a reaction that falls short of a solution. The author may refuse to believe in God as some kind of protest, because it “seems like” God must endorse the suffering.
Ok, now what? The suffering we’ve declared unacceptable is still there. Withholding belief in God as an ethical protest is a sentimental reaction that achieves nothing.
This is the point where Hinduism considers our real human life to begin, at this realisation of the ethical unacceptability of our existence here. Now we’re ready to seriously inquire into not only the cause, but more importantly, the solution for evil and suffering.
To quote from my former days as an apologist: most all emotions have an underlying rationale, and rationality does not function without a values that are inherently emotional in nature. The goal isn’t to blame God as much as it is to blame and highlight an inconsistency with *belief in such* as good. (And only a good God can be real right?)
The whole point of Emerson’s original article is to demonstrate that withholding belief does accomplish something: the first being the acknowledgement of the lack of logical consistency of an all good and an all knowing/powerful God, and the second addressing some of the suffering itself. Belief or disbelief in God may not solve the problem of suffering, but a tri-omni type God understood with its full implications ADDS to it by introducing more absurdities, such as his benevolent all-encompassing divine will endorsing all that comes to pass, including all the evil. This demand perverts and undermines our understanding of goodness and is ultimately nihilistic.
Those who are relieved of suffering by believing in (such type of) God are either in denial or ignorance of its dark side, or are worshiping a fundamentally different type of God that happens to have the same name. Holding on to a belief of this view of God as an ethical protest or a sentimental reaction achieves nothing.
Emerson’s purpose here isn’t to propose an exhaustive solution to suffering, but Hinduism (or any religion’s) call to heroic action function perfectly fine without a foreknowing and omnipotent God. Perhaps it would function even better, since we do not have to question our loyalty and love to the deity we devote ourselves too
Hinduism’s solution to suffering doesn’t function at all without God. Without God there is no solution to evil and suffering, we can only endure it. For Hindu metaphysics, the idea God has a dark side, or that he creates (or endorses) suffering is logically incoherent. It’s like saying darkness can exist in the presence of light, or that light creates and endorses darkness.
If someone is as concerned about suffering as Emerson says he is - “That suffering bird is a thing of cosmic significance...” you’d expect him to be desperate to find a solution. But he concludes non-belief in God is the best moral stance. His solution reduces us to impotent bystanders who can do nothing but helplessly weep at our existential predicament. There are far better answers available.
Great post and you are right in that any theist, and in particular Christians (as I commit to), have to take the problem of suffering and evil very seriously in every respect. Pat Flynn has a great Substack (tongue-in-cheekily called “Journal of Absolute Truth”) where he approaches a lot of these challenges in a few solid ways. I would have linked to it, but I’m apparently not smart enough to figure out how to do so in an iPhone..🤷♂️
If I have the correct article in mind, it’s one that’s saying the problem of evil for the physicalist is also problematic. Yet I would argue that the traditional tri-omni-max conception of theism adds and compounds the problem of suffering in a way no other worldview can. Every theodicy that refuses to undermine God’s power ends up undermining or redefining omni-benevolence beyond recognition.
I’ve felt typical Christian theists have had it all wrong. I don’t think Christianity is about marginalizing people’s suffering and saying it doesn’t matter.
We see in John 11, Jesus weeps when he gets to Lazarus’s tomb and he sees his dead body.
When Jesus feeds the 5000, his apostles are wanting to send the people away, but Jesus tells them they must be fed… I’ve wondered if the reason people followed Jesus, was because he was so aware to the suffering people felt, and he actually did things about it. He healed people, fed them, forgave them of their shame, he dignified them.
I don’t think the argument of theism is about acknowledging a “good God” allowing bad things. Because all evidence of Jesus is about getting rid of the bad things. I think the argument if theism is understanding “why the bad things happened in the first place.”
My best suggestion is looking back to Genesis. Adam & Eve. God telling Adam and Eve to “rule over the earth.”
I believe the earth was meant to be humans domaine, in partnership with God.
But with man eating the apple and partnering with the serpent, it became the devils domaine as well.
A good God didn’t intend for that to happen, but God also gave us control over our choices, because we were meant to rule.
So suffering on this earth is meant to anger us, because of the DNA God built into us & We’re actually meant to do things about it - with the partnership of Jesus.
Jesus uses this language of the Kingdom of heaven forcefully advancing - through our prayers and actions.
I don’t know if this explains cancer, death, greed. But I do think it offers a perspective that our actions matter, we can be righteously angry at death, and believe in a good God who is trying to correct that…
Why does he wait so long, I don’t know. Maybe he is doing more about it than we realize.
What do you think?
I think this argument accidentally makes a case for Theism while placing the responsibility on each individual. If the question is about a belief in God being immoral because a theist would have to, at least implicitly, endorse the suffering of another, while the sufferer themselves would not agree, I would question why the question about whether the theist believes that they would agree to the same, or any type of suffering for that matter, is not being raised. If their belief in God meant that they felt that any suffering they endured in view of a greater good would be justified, you would basically be saying that their belief in God is immoral even though it would be consistent and not hypocritical in terms of permissible suffering. Either their belief is not immoral because it is consistent, or they can only account for the permissible suffering justification for their own life. In which case the responsibility would be placed on each individual.
The immorality would then lie in the level of authority the belief demands from others who are not convinced of the legitimacy of this definition of the greater good.
What someone’s suffering means to them is up for them to determine and they should not be forced into a lesser solution.
That’s fair enough, but undermines the purpose of the OP which suggests that the belief is immoral on the basis of betraying the suffering of others.
I think there might be another demand of theism that you don't consider above. You're right that theism has normative implications, but not just for what we already believe about the moral state of the world. If theism is true, there are more values than you would otherwise think, and more final values than you would otherwise think. For example, union with God is a final value that's not possibly realized on atheism. So a particular state of affairs that has weighty final disvalue on atheism might have an instrumental value or irrelevant disvalue on theism.
Think of Cain and Abel, following Eleonore Stump. Cain's brutal, needless, unjustified murder of Abel is surely horrific and disvaluable in its own right. Theists can say this. But given Abel's right-standing with God, his union with God is protected. He is in a morally significant sense (according to theism) safe. Cain, on the other hand, is in poor standing with God given his sin. Cain is in danger, despite the security of his earthly well-being.
I don't raise this example as any kind of theodicy, or even that you would find the example persuasive, but only to illustrate some normative aspects of theism that I think are commonly neglected, especially by those with consequentialist tendencies. If you are really to entertain the moral state of the world on theism, you have to also thereby consider what theism predicts is valuable, and most importantly what it says is of final value. This might require going beyond bare theism.
Regarding some of the other points, I truly lament that you have found some Christians or otherwise theists dismissive of suffering. That surely is not warranted. With respect to animal suffering, I find Swinburne's line persuasive, or at least plausible, that animals are not cognitively sophisticated enough to appreciate the badness of pain. This way, they don't suffer as much as we think they do.
So what do we make of events that draw people away from God that isn’t of their own doing? The same problem remains.
What suffering means to someone is a process they must work through on their own, and whatever prescribed and perhaps preordained meaning assigned to their suffering or violation is insulting. Religions should focus on using their tools for redeeming suffering instead of committing themselves to views that say suffering was never that terrible to begin with, bc they are a part of some higher values they were yet to be convinced of. Why else can’t I just abduct people for scientific experimentation for the greater good?
Union with God is far from an orthodox value in the western Church, though it brings some interesting perspective of “perhaps the suffering was really of my own doing,” because the individual becomes closer to being the divine and its will.
The western churches have pretty explicitly put the exaltation of Godself as the ultimate moral goal. The elevation of Godself and his will over the suffering creature comes off as dismissive and contemptible, which perhaps wouldn’t be so problematic if the expectation of God was set to be exhaustively caring and the value of a human life to be so solemnly important.
im not sure i understand the betrayal part. if god's permission of certain evils is the morally right thing to do, how does this idea of betrayal fit in? the acceptance that the permission of this evil is morally right (theism) need not focus on the agent per se, but the action itself. even if some perceived higher morality is accessed on part of the sacrifice of some agent, this higher morality is beyond and prior to the agent which has had some part of it sacrificed.
do the earlier parts of this post imply only moral realists can raise the problem of evil? or at least only cognitivists?